West Should Support Anti-Taliban Massoud in Afghanistan
By Russell Slater
After nearly twenty years of military involvement in the Central Asian nation of Afghanistan, the United States and their allies have called it quits in their efforts at nation-building. Our mission in the country should have been narrowly defined to begin with, however, since we stuck around, we should help the “good guys” in ways that don’t involve total military re-deployment.
Son of a lion
Right now, the only boots on the ground that matter in the fight for the future of the country are those who have rallied under the banner of Ahmad Massoud, son of the famous anti-Taliban and anti-Soviet fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, aka the “Lion of Panjshir.” The elder Massoud was assassinated by Al Qaeda terrorists posing as journalists only two days before the group’s infamous attacks on 9–11–01.
At 32-years-old, the younger Massoud has already established himself as a political leader in the aftermath of the Ghani government collapse. He has a bachelor’s degree in war studies from King’s College in the UK as well as a master’s degree in international politics from the University of London. Given his early performance thus far in organizing and leading the armed resistance, in addition to his father’s ever-looming legacy, Massoud is an ideal ally for the west.
Along with the former vice president of the country Amrullah Saleh (who now claims the title of “caretaker president”) and forces of the former Afghan national security forces, Massoud has declared his intention to follow in his father’s footsteps in his struggle to free the country of tyrannical, religiously-imposed government. He appears to have the appropriate background and tools at his disposal to be a future national leader — but he needs friends outside of the Panjshir valley.
This tiny sliver of resistance to the Taliban, a religious/political/military entity emanating from the Islamic madrassas of Pakistan, often with covert as well as overt support from the Pakistani intelligence and military, is the last holdout against the previously lightly armed juggernaut that has taken their country by storm. The Panjshir valley was not conquered by Taliban during their previous reign from 1996–2001, nor did it succumb to Soviet tanks and aircraft during their prior failed occupation.
Currently, it remains the last bastion of an Afghanistan that thousands of NATO troops gave their lives for. Given the unique geography of the area, the military advantage of the defenders on the “high ground” of mountainous slopes means that the Taliban will have to go in with overwhelming numbers to suppress the current and historical holdout.
However, the fact remains that Panjshir is also geographically cut off from outside sources of help. It shares no common border with a potential ally, and even the supportive Tajiks are more than 250 miles away. They need resupply to keep up the fight, and according to the most recent reports, their enclave is completely surrounded. The ammunition, food and other needed supplies has to come from somewhere. If such support is to materialize, who will be the source?
Questions
The question the Biden administration and so many other Americans have been asking themselves recently, especially those who have served in the country, is why did Afghanistan fall so rapidly to a foe who should have, on paper, been no match for the western-back, US-trained and armed national security forces? How could they have melted away so quickly like a snowball in the summer sun?
With a deep level of distrust of the Ghani government, it is of little wonder why the average soldier or policeman on the ground gave up without wanting to risk their lives on behalf of a regime they felt was not worth defending. Tales of corruption such as commanders withholding the pay of soldiers, in some cases troops and police working without compensation for months, only fueled the string of chronic issues faced by those tasked with defending the country.
The difference between the forces organized under the authority of the now defunct Kabul government and the Massoud resistance is a clear will to fight. Bolstered by the addition of Afghan troops who have vowed to struggle on, this reincarnated version of the Northern Alliance has shown their collective warrior spirit and willingness to bring the fight to the enemy.
The answer to a humiliated NATO, the United States in particular, is to recover through some means of forceful counterattack. Although on our “way out,” in the mainly military sense at least, we should tell these extremists now in power that they will continue to be haunted by our “ghost presence” — what does that mean exactly?
How did we get the Taliban out of power the first time?
Intelligence sharing. CIA and other assets passing information on to the nucleolus of the new resistance that has formed in Panjshir. Air support, particularly the use of drones to minimize risk to air force personnel. Covert operations to help their fighters take back key areas and equipment (or else destroy it, or otherwise render it inoperable for the Taliban who currently have possession of it).
Remember, the war didn’t begin with a full-blown military invasion involving shock and awe, the way we did in Iraq. We used Special Forces operations teams on the ground as well as overwhelming airpower to assist the Northern Alliance in their fight against them. In fact, the first American casualty in the war was not a solider of the US Army, nor any military branch for that matter. It was “Mike” Spann, a CIA officer in the agency’s Special Activities Division. In a little over two months (from the start of operations on October 7th, 2001 to the December 17th fall of Kabul), we successfully drove the Taliban from power.
Should we choose to withhold material support for any anti-Taliban forces, there still remain other options outside of large-scale military re-engagement. At the very least, we should have Special Forces disabling or destroying as many operational aircraft as possible that the Taliban have captured from the Afghan national forces who surrendered. Preventing the Taliban from having power of the skies will go a long way in helping those who are brave enough to carry on the fight.
Thorn in their side
The bottom line is this: the war in Afghanistan is not over. If we don’t want history to repeat itself yet again, we should inject some wisdom into our foreign policy by giving those fighting our enemy the edge they need for victory, or at the very least, to remain a thorn in the side of the Taliban the way they were a thorn in the side of the NATO forces for the past two decades.
